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ABSTRACT 
 
 Neuroimaging has appeared in the courtroom as a type of ‗evidence‘ to 
support claims about whether or not criminals should be held accountable for their 
crimes. Yet the ability to abstract notions of culpability and criminal behavior with 
confidence from these imagines is unclear. As there remains much to be discovered in the 
relationship between personal responsibility, criminal behavior, and neurological 
abnormalities, questions have been raised toward neuroimaging as an appropriate means 
to validate these claims.  
 This project explores the limits and legitimacy of neuroimaging as a means of 
understanding behavior and culpability in determining appropriate criminal sentencing. It 
highlights key philosophical issues surrounding the ability to use neuroimaging to 
support this process, and proposes a method of ensuring their proper use. By engaging 
case studies and a thought experiment, this project illustrates the circumstances in which 
neuroimaging may assist in identifying particular characteristics relevant for criminal 
sentencing.  
I argue that it is not a question of whether or not neuroimaging itself holds 
validity in determining a criminals guilt or motives, but rather a proper application of the 
issue is to focus on the way in which information regarding these images is 
communicated from the ‗expert‘ scientists to the ‗non-expert‘ making decisions about the 
sentence that are most important. Those who are considering this information‘s 
relevance, a judge or jury, are typically not well versed in criminal neuroscience and 
interpreting the significance of different images. I advocate the way in which this 
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information is communicated from the scientist-informer to the decision-maker parallels 
in importance to its actual meaning. 
 As a solution, I engage Roger Pielke‘s model of honest brokering as a solution to 
ensure the appropriate use of neuroimaging in determining criminal responsibility and 
sentencing. A thought experiment follows to highlight the limits of science, engage 
philosophical repercussions, and illustrate honest brokering as a means of resolution. To 
achieve this, a hypothetical dialogue reminiscent of Kenneth Schaffner‘s ‗tools for 
talking‘ with behavioral geneticists and courtroom professionals will exemplify these 
ideas.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
As advances in technology continue to impact our social and personal lives, we, 
as moral agents of this age, are challenged to contemplate its repercussions and to explore 
potential regulations which might guide such advances. Scientific findings and data are 
raising new (and re-raising some old) questions about human nature, psychology, free 
will, responsibility, and consciousness. The courtroom is no exception, and those 
involved in legal proceedings are now being confronted with the task of understanding 
the implications, interpretations, and functions of complex scientific material as evidence.  
Claims have been made that a defect in neurological structure, or a tumor or a 
lesion, can be the cause of criminal behavior
6,7,11,18,20
. Neuroimaging data in particular 
has been used to support such claims, sparking serious discussion about how the legal 
system is to define, or redefine, concepts of competency and responsibility
3,5,11
. And 
while such data may assist in understanding the nature and origins of criminal behavior, 
there still exists a pressing and preliminary problem: How are non-scientists, such as the 
jury members and judge, to understand this information, such that they can make 
decisions about the moral culpability of criminals? The philosophical meaning of this 
information is the source of ongoing debates amongst neuroscientists and bioethicists. 
But for those with no formal or informal training in science or ethics, it is an even more 
complex task to make decisions about how neurological scans should be used in the 
courtroom. Yet this complex task currently presses judges and juries in the US legal 
system. 
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The complexity of neuroimaging data to be considered in the courtroom may 
require judges to seek a crash course in neuroscience and neuroethics, such as the 
―bootcamp‖ offered annually at the University of Pennsylvania. At the least, judges will 
need a trustworthy – and trusted – agent, such as an ―honest broker‖27, to help sort 
through the complexity. In either case, the use of novel science as evidence in the 
courtroom is an interdisciplinary and interprofessional issue, where a collaboration of 
professionals with diverse training is required to make progress. Were such 
collaborations to take place, the conversations between these professionals could be very 
important in determining how the data is used.  
Imagine a judge seeking expert advice from an honest broker about how to 
interpret – even how to conceive of the relevance of – neuroimaging data. The judge‘s 
understanding will depend largely on the quality and quantity of information the scientist 
delivers, and how well he or she explains it such that the information is appropriately 
received. The scientist must decide what information is essential, relevant but perhaps 
worth omitting, and negligibly important. He or she must provide enough information for 
the judge to make informed decisions, but not overwhelm the judge with irrelevant 
details. The ability to communicate clearly about what neuroimaging data is measuring, 
and what that means as far as determining relevant qualities for a criminal case, is a skill 
in and of itself, and one that we cannot assume all scientists have developed. At the same 
time, the well-intentioned judge must be prepared to engage in scientific thinking about 
neuroimaging data; this capacity for ―scientific literacy‖15 is apparently quite rare in the 
legal system, as in our society more broadly. Collaboration between scientifically literate 
judges and effective, aboveboard communicators of neuroscientific information, could 
3 
 
very well lead to an appropriate resolution of the proper place of neuroimaging data in 
the courtroom.  
Neuroimages have already made an appearance in courtrooms for some time. 
Their receipt by participants in criminal proceedings varies by trail, no doubt affected by 
different juries, case types, testimonies, and information provided about the images. It 
may also be due to a lack of clarity toward what kind of abstractions toward functions of 
personality and moral decision making can be made from looking at a picture. To look at 
a neuroimaging scan and claim with certainty that a person is capable or incapable of a 
violent act like murder is beyond the abilities of our present technology. But making 
determinations of guilt by considering an image showing particular area of the brain that 
is not functioning properly, perhaps one that is associated with impulsivity or aggression, 
and determining the relationship of the brain to dimensions of criminality is already a 
pressing question that is assumed by the incorporation of this technology as a type of 
evidence.  
Individual judges may determine the relevance of neuroimaging as evidence in 
particular cases by calling on expert scientists to help decipher the legitimacy of 
particular claims being made about scans. Federal Rule of Evidence 706
10
 explicitly 
discusses the ability to call upon experts in a particular field to help interpret the validity 
of data, as well as what kinds of abstractions may be gleaned about its application to a 
specific trial. Whether neuroimaging enters the court by the gatekeeping of a judge, or by 
default of a lawyer‘s defense or prosecution, its use is already in full swing. The focus of 
this project is not to discuss whether or not neuroimaging ought to be used as a type of 
evidence; it already is. Nor does this project suggest a solution to be placed into the 
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existing legal regime. It is less concerned with setting a new standard of how to deal with 
neuroimaging in the courtroom, or instructing how specific practices should be conducted 
surrounding their use. Instead it focuses more on whether or not neuroimaging can 
illuminate important factors related to matters of justice for those making decisions for 
criminal sentencing. 
Creating a bridge of understanding between those in the justice system and those 
with expertise in the field of criminal neuroscience is essential to successful and 
appropriate use of these scans and understanding criminal behavior. By permitting 
neuroimaging as a form of evidence in the courtroom, certain questions automatically 
arise relating to its ability to depict physiological components of guilt, rationality, moral 
behavior, and other dimensions of criminality. In order to understand what circumstances 
these technologies may assist in determining characteristics relevant to criminal 
sentencing, information coming from the scientific experts, acting as informants of 
neuroimaging, must be accessible and trustworthy. Honest brokering is a method of doing 
so, and a means of achieving these ends.  
Only then can the philosophical implications associated with questions pertaining 
to guilt, competency, and neurological functioning be engaged in an appropriate manner. 
This will assist in addressing the increasing need to understand how neuroscientific data 
– particularly, brain scan data – about individuals on trial might relate to a defendant‘s 
capacity, legal culpability, and ultimate responsibility for action. What neuroimaging data 
can reliably reveal about these issues in the legal system will ultimately depend on 
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collaboration between legal experts, experts in criminal psychology, neuroscientists, and 
bioethicists
a
.  
The idea of some sort of ‗collaboration‘ is described loosely to allow flexibility in 
the form it takes. It can occur between a judge and scientific advisor in the judge‘s 
private chamber, in the form of workshops, or as a nationally arranged panel focusing on 
a specific question. This project also refrains from making claims about what this kind of 
interaction should look like in practice, or how it should blend with current legal systems. 
The form this collaboration takes is intentionally left undefined, as the object of focus is 
rather to engage in more abstract dimensions of what constitutes appropriate application 
of neuroimaging for criminal sentencing.  
I advocate that what matters most is there is a cooperative effort to create an 
honest representation of the facts and issues at hand, a willingness to communicate 
openly, and some sort of experience or authority in the political and neuroscientific field. 
It‘s ideal that together the parties are knowledgeable enough about the policy making 
process, neuroscience and criminal psychology, and equipped to engage in discussion 
about the philosophical questions created in their overlap; namely what neuroimaging can 
offer to questions of moral competency and criminal behavior, and the proper limits of 
the use of this science in a courtroom setting.  
 
 
 
                                                          
a
 An even broader collaboration of ideas and people from diverse backgrounds will aid in 
creating a more accurate and holistic impression of what‘s at stake in making claims 
about personhood and the mind from interpreting neurological images. However, this 
must be balanced against efficiency for progress and streamlining discussion. 
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Goals and Methods 
This thesis will explore some philosophical and legal dimensions of using 
neuroimaging data in criminal proceedings, and highlight the need for careful 
collaboration between those involved in criminal proceedings and credible scientists. 
First it explores the validity of using brain scans as a type of legitimate evidence in 
criminal cases. There is already literature about whether neuroimaging data can 
determine the moral or cognitive capacity of individuals, yet this discussion will be taken 
a step further. It is important to understand not only whether neuroimages can impart any 
relevant information in determining the culpability of criminals on trial, but also how to 
think about the deliberation and communication of these issues between neuroscientists 
and judges. This is where conversations regarding the insight of what neuroimaging can 
provide in understanding criminality are extended, as a discourse understanding what is 
required for appropriate use of this information follows.  
There is much at stake when determining what kinds of conclusions may be made 
from these scans, because they relate directly to an individual‘s personhood. The ways in 
which competency, guilt, and responsibility are influenced by the interpretation of 
neuroimaging data has the potential to revolutionize the justice system. We can keep this 
in mind as we explore case studies and hypothetical dialogue. Taking this debate 
seriously has important repercussions for understanding how the minds of criminals 
work, and how the justice system (and, more broadly, society) holds them accountable for 
their actions.  
While literature exists on the hopes for and limitations of neuroimaging, its 
potential to reveal truth of moral psychology, and its relationship with biology, a bridge 
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between this literature and an appropriate application for a legal setting may be indulged 
further. There is also existing literature on how biology, medicine, and the law should 
come together
22 
in a way that is proper and just. This project moves from speculation and 
contemplation to clarifying what questions and issues are pertinent to understand in 
moving into a proper resolution of the matter. What will follow is a thought experiment 
to highlight the philosophical dimensions of the use of these scans in a courtroom setting. 
It explores and exemplifies a hypothetical integration of professionals which might 
collaborate and engage in conversation to discuss the use of neuroimaging in the 
courtroom.  
To examine some of the issues currently in debate within the intersection of 
neuroscience and the law, I will create a dialogue between a judge and an expert in 
interpreting neuroimaging data. The hypothetical situation involves a judge engaging an 
expert of neuroscience to gain an understanding of scans for personal interest and 
professional application. The conversation occurs in a casual atmosphere without the 
pressure of a trial in motion. This will provide a unique medium to explore the nature and 
limits of what information can be gleaned from brain scans, with special focus toward 
criminal responsibility and propensity toward recidivism. A dialogue is advantageous 
because it allows us to address the perceivable issues that may arise from the merging of 
new science into a courtroom setting. It can exemplify how to maintain appropriate 
boundaries between the role of the scientist-informer and the judge or political advisee. It 
is an ideal method to demonstrate how to navigate the bridging of neuroimaging into the 
courtroom. 
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The dialogue format allows for an exchange of scientific and ethical dimensions 
of making claims about criminal responsibility using neuroimaging. It aims to provide a 
platform illustrating what an honest conversation seeking insight to the nature of criminal 
behavior could look like, while highlighting tools for doing so effectively. It‘s purposely 
designed in a way that dissuades this conversation take place literally, so attention may 
instead be allocated toward exploring broader questions at hand. The dialogue can be 
viewed as a more engaged method of imagining what is involved in an ideal exchange 
between a neuroscientist and a judge seeking information on the application of 
neuroimaging in his court. 
I emulate a style of reasoning exemplified by philosopher of science Kenneth 
Schaffner in his exploration of the role of behavioral genetics in the courtroom.
27,28
 
Schaffner develops some hypothetical dialogues between a judge and a behavioral 
geneticist as a means of exploring ―tools for talking‖ about the science in a courtroom 
context.  I adopt this rhetorical and analytical style as a promising means for also 
discussing neuroimaging. His piece is an excellent example of the kind of honest 
brokering necessary to bring about an appropriate use of science in the courtroom. The 
dialogue format is a tool that explores some of the issues that may arise in such an 
interaction, and suggests an appropriate resolution. A dialogue also allows for illustration 
of what honest brokering between these two parties looks like. It also provides an 
explanation of how different imaging processes work, what they measure, and what kind 
of information may be gleaned from them. It is not only an exercise in how an expert 
might successfully describe this information to an inquiring non-expert, but also 
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highlights the necessary limitations of each party‘s role. These limitations should be 
adhered to so just use of this information proceeds. 
Schaffner does not believe genetics are the only force to consider when analyzing 
behavior, and acknowledges the complexity of understanding a person‘s motivations and 
action. In a courtroom setting, he advocates a wider perspective be considered when 
using genetics as evidence for particular behaviors. I would say that this is true for 
neuroimaging data as well. It seems to be a trendy technique in science to decipher 
what‘s going on in minds of people, and criminals, with the hope that an idea of neural 
processes will help paint an accurate picture of one‘s ability to make rational and moral 
decisions. While neuroimages do not give a clear and definite window into the inner 
workings of one‘s mind, it may be that they can provide something reliable in regard to 
the mental capacities of people awaiting sentencing; if so, then it is worth investigating 
their value as evidence. 
Before engaging in the dialogue, consideration into the past use of neuroimaging 
in the courtroom will contextualize some of the issues that arise from its present use. The 
development of neuroimaging‘s acceptance into the courtroom will aid in understanding 
its attractive and prospective qualities. This will set up a platform to examine the ongoing 
debate among scholars over the use of neuroimaging data in the courtroom, and highlight 
the currency and importance of this issue. I will discuss the complexity of making claims 
about something like guilt or competency, when such traits are impossible to measure 
directly, through an interpretation of corporeal processes like how the brain ‗lights up‘ for 
particular stimuli. I argue through case studies that there are particular cases when the use 
of neuroimaging may be appropriate in the courtroom setting, as a source of relevant 
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information about a person‘s mental faculties. However, it‘s important to define the 
boundaries of how to use neuroimages, so as to avoid misuse.  
Accordingly, I will discuss the current limits of neuroimaging itself, and the 
importance for understanding these limits in the courtroom context. This will lay the 
foundation for my exploration of the second driving question, addressing the methods of 
conveying these concepts between expert and non-expert. Applying Roger Pielke‘s work 
describing different modes of interaction between science and politics, I propose applying 
Pielke‘s description of honest brokering as an avenue to encourage the proper use of 
neuroimaging.  This will then be illustrated via a hypothetical dialogue in emulation of 
Schaffner‘s work with behavioral genetics. The concluding section of the thesis will 
summarize my analysis and raise new questions for further discussion in the future. 
  
The Development of Neuroimaging as Evidence in Criminal Trials: Origins of the 
Insanity Plea 
 While a comprehensive review of the past use of medical technique and opinion 
in the courtroom isn‘t completely pertinent, a basic grasp of its evolution is useful. The 
courtroom environment is dynamic when new scientific techniques appear in the 
courtroom, yet this pattern is nothing new in itself. To exemplify- a case from 1843 of 
Daniel M‘Naghten, a Scottish woodturner who was acquitted on the basis of insanity for 
the murder of Edward Drummond, secretary to England‘s Prime Minister. M‘Naghten 
had spent years operating a successful woodturning business, staying sober and living 
frugally to amass a sizable wealth. Three years before the murder, he sold his business 
and disappeared to London, Glasgow, and briefly France. Testimony supported the 
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evidence that throughout his time he had few correspondences with anyone. What little 
he held pointed to his belief that he was being chased by spies hired by a British political 
party; beliefs which were discarded by others as delusions. After the murder of 
Drummond on January 20th 1843 in London, the trial was noted to have been organized 
and held at an expedited pace, indicating the severity with which the British legal system 
responded to their Secretary‘s death. Daniel M‘Naghten‘s plea amounted to insanity; his 
defense held that delusions of persecution caused a complete breakdown of his moral 
capacity and ability to determine right versus wrong. While both the defense and 
prosecution conceded he was delusional, the severity of his delusions and their 
consequence for sentencing were debated. He was deemed responsible for his actions and 
found guilty
12,19
.  
 Now this was certainly not the first plea in history that registered the defendant as 
unaccountable for his crimes, but it‘s worth noting in order to bring together two critical 
aspects of neuroimaging in the courtroom: burden of proof and diseases of the mind. 
During Daniel M‘Naghten‘s trial the House of Lords set an example for the basis of the 
modern plea of insanity, which came to be known as the M‘Naghten rules12,19. The 
fundamental idea behind these rules is that jurors ought to assume sanity until proven 
otherwise. This legal philosophy shaped the evolution of how the courts view the impact 
of mental illness on crime itself, and not necessarily the sentencing of the convicted. The 
burden of proof when dealing with cases of mental illness and pleas of insanity developed 
hand in hand with medical technologies that researched the origin of the mind and how 
physical properties of the brain related to it
12,19
. 
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 M‘Naghten‘s case had a bold presence in the public sphere, in part because of his 
Drummond‘s status, but also because it brought philosophical questions about the nature 
of the mind, responsibility, competence, and criminal sentencing with it. These questions 
were now something to be contemplated and discussed by laymen, and the issues took a 
more prominent focus for lawmakers as well. What became of the case set a new trend in 
handling cases of mental illness. Rather than being a legal issue, the insanity plea 
transferred the responsibility of the defendant into a medical issue. His case changed how 
mental illness is viewed in the courtroom, and its influences still remain present in 
present courtrooms. Now, instead of going to prison, a criminal excused for insanity 
would instead be institutionalized.  
The difference is important, as psychiatric care may be seen as a more pleasant 
alternative to some criminals inclined to falsely plead insanity and avoid life in prison. 
The insanity plea pertains to our discussion of neuroimaging because in some cases, it is 
offered to courts as a type of ‗evidence‘ to support such pleas. Colored images and 
comparisons to ‗normal‘ people‘s tests are proposed as a means to validate that a 
defendant is in fact mentally disabled to the point where (s)he should not be held fully 
responsible for his or her actions.  
 
Trials and Tribulations  
The 2007 case of Peter Braunstein became an influential case for the use of 
neuroimaging in criminal trials. Braunstein was a writer living in New York who attacked 
multiple women, posed as a New York fireman to gain trust of one of his victims, created 
a list of gay men he planned to ‗punish‘, plotted to kill the editor of Vogue magazine, and 
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attempted suicide. It took four weeks to track him down for arrest when he assaulted a 
woman in his fireman disguise, putting chloroform over her face and taping his sexual 
assault. A psychiatrist was put on stand to testify that based on ―this scan, without 
knowing anything else, I would say this person has changes in personality, will have 
difficulty planning, making executive judgments and thinking ahead‖. And when pressed 
further and asked whether the scan would indicate a ―complete inability to plan‖, the 
expert testified ―the answer to your question is yes‖. This is a situation where an expert is 
being pressed to declare with definite belief the idea that there is an exclusive relationship 
between the mind and localized areas of the brain. The jury, however, did not take this 
declaration at face value and concluded that the facts of the case overrode the expert‘s 
opinion that the defendant could literally not have planned the assault. Regardless of the 
outcome of this case, it gives perception to the responsibility that experts have in the 
courtroom
3
. 
To the jury, Braunstein‘s scans were considered an inadequate force of influence 
compared to other variables of his trail. The psychiatrist‘s claims that he exhibited a 
mental deficit strong enough to make planning such an attack ‗impossible‘ seemed to 
hold no weight against the intricacy and detail involved in his attack. Gathering materials 
for smoke bombs, chloroform and ties for his victim‘s hands, disguise as a fireman, and 
conducting the research necessary to orchestrate his plot convinced the jury that planning 
was certainly something Braunstein was capable of. The claims of the psychiatrist on trial 
also bring into focus a risk in assuming a physiological abnormality directly results in a 
predictable behavior, when it is much more complex.  
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It‘s noteworthy to point out that while areas of the brain are specialized, it is often 
overlooked that the neurological function, while considered localized, is distributed over 
a vast network of neural centers. Applying this to the burden of proof is difficult when 
considering the brain‘s ability to spread a specialized function over multiple regions. 
Even when there is clear and definitive damage to a specific area of the brain, it is 
difficult to say it lacks the ability to outsource that job to another area; particularly when 
considering modern understanding of neuroplasticity. It‘s important to not oversimplify 
the brain and neurological functioning. 
The brain‘s ability to outsource function and behavior from neural pathways must 
be considered on an individual basis. Each person‘s unique mapping must be interpreted 
on a case to case basis by an expert. There is also a difference in interpreting functional 
readings of the brain mapping the path of signals across time, as opposed to scans which 
take ‗snapshots‘ at a single point in time. Understanding a person‘s mapping requires 
individual analysis due to derivations from the nonexistent textbook-standard. While 
considering the brain‘s ability to coordinate behavior, it is crucial to understand these 
possible derivations and apply them to each individual map.  
Returning to the case of Braunstein, this is a perfect example of a misconstrued 
belief of a conformed model of neural centers. Without careful attention to these 
dynamics by experts, it can be dangerous for the uninformed observer to place his trust in 
an oversimplified explanation- which could make the difference between two judgments 
or two sentences. For this reason, it is critical that expert witnesses or experts in science 
called to play an advisory role are credible. Credible, not only to their knowledge of the 
subject, but also in an unbiased and forthright way. It is paramount their testimony is not 
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only one that is rooted in scientific fact and theory, but displays an understanding that 
these facts and theories carry a dynamic synergy with their relationship to the brain.  
Let‘s explore another case. John Hinckley was born in Oklahoma, 1955. As a 
romantic who indulged in tranquilizers, anti-depressants, second amendment rights, and 
fictitious girlfriends, it could be said that he was a stone‘s throw away from being 
diagnosed with a serious mental illness even without a professional‘s diagnosis. He first 
sees Jodie Foster playing a child prostitute in the 1976 film Taxi Driver alongside Robert 
De Niro. His character develops plans to assassinate a presidential candidate. In what 
could be called love at first sight, Hinkley moved across the country to attend Yale in an 
attempt to woo, or possibly stalk, Jodie Foster who attended classes there. After failing to 
make any real type of connection with her, John developed plans to win her heart in a 
way that might be considered a bit more extreme than say, a bouquet of flowers and 
invitation to dinner. Somewhere between his plans to hijack an airplane or commit 
suicide in front of her, Hinkley decided that he must do something drastic and settled on 
assassinating someone who he considered to be as important as she was. Taking notes on 
Lee Harvey Oswald, John Hinckley walked up to President Ronald Reagan in 1981 and 
fired six shots into his direction. While no one was killed, attempted assassination is still 
a crime. Without even trying to flee John Hinckley was arrested and put on trial
3,30
.  
 During Hinckley‘s trial, the defense petitioned the judge to allow neurological 
scanning of Hinckley‘s brain to be admitted as evidence, as a means to provide proof of 
his insanity plea. His lawyers were given permission to admit CT-scans which, 
characteristic of schizophrenia, showed a widening in the sulci, or grooves, of his brain. 
Hinckley was found not guilty of any charges on the grounds of insanity, and has been 
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held in psychiatric care since. The implications of this verdict were huge following the 
trial, specifically when dealing with pleas of insanity
30. The passing of Hinckley‘s not-
guilty verdict came at a time where the conception of ‗mind equals brain‘ was beginning 
to become popular. The idea that jurors might find these scans extremely persuasive, 
regardless of insanity, shouldn‘t be dismissed though just because of preconceived 
notions however;  it just makes the need for an ‗honest broker‘ type of expert even more 
serious. 
 Now the example of the psychiatrist testifying in the case of Peter Braunstein isn‘t 
necessarily the best case to outline criticism for the amount of trust being placed in expert 
witnesses. The jurors rejected the unequivocal testimony and deemed the defendant 
responsible for the charges. It‘s important to note that the criticism did not stem from the 
method of scanning or imaging, but of the opinion of the psychiatrist. The brain‘s 
relationship to the mind is not black or white; this grey area doesn‘t definitively include 
all or no relationship between corporeal and intangible. It tends to be the grandiose, black 
or white declarations presented to jurors, even if the intention is to honestly use this 
science to the best of the expert‘s ability.  
The difference between the cases of Braunstein and Hinckley, other than the 
verdict, is subtle. In the case of Braunstein, the psychiatrist was pressed to paint a picture 
that the defendant‘s insanity that in no way could possibly hold him responsible. In 
Hinckley‘s case, his defense provided evidence that his brain displayed established 
characteristics of mental illness, and let the judge and jury assign responsibility. 
Contrasting these two cases can provide insight into the weight neural imaging can play a 
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strong role in criminal proceedings and sentencing. What this shows is neuroscience 
needs to be understood, those explaining its significance need to be clear and credible. 
 
Chapter 2 
The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly 
Acquired Malfunction  
 The idea that there is a link between the brain and behavior is not a new one. 
Cases of brain injury have served tremendously to educate scientists and scholars of this 
relationship. The case of Phineas Gage is a classic example, when a drastic change in 
personality and proclivity towards abnormally aggressive behavior was observed after 
Gage‘s brain injury. It fostered some big questions about the relationship of the brain to 
an individual‘s personality and behaviors. It remains a notorious case of how social, 
moral, and rational capacities may be altered (or completely compromised) by 
neurological damage. Although this was an accident, and not a result of disease or 
genetics, his drastic change in personality has set a foundation for modern conversations 
regarding personal responsibility and neurological functioning.  
A correlated, modern case of a similar sort may be that of a forty-year-old school 
teacher, who began to display drastically uncharacteristic behavior out of the blue. 
Described by friends and family as benign and upstanding, he enigmatically developed 
strong and aggressive sexual impulses, along with pedophilia. He tried to molest his 
twelve-year-old step daughter, solicited prostitutes, sexually and physically attacked his 
landlord, and began watching child pornography on the internet. He was convicted of 
child molestation, with the choice of a jail sentence or completion of a twelve-step 
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program for sexual addiction. The man did not want to go to jail, so he enrolled in the 
addiction recovery program. Yet despite his enrollment in the program, he still could not 
curb his compulsive sexual behavior, and continued to be sexually aggressive
6,11
. 
 When he went to the hospital complaining of a severe and persistent headache, 
that neurological tests revealed something more serious than a headache was occurring. 
He failed to pass basic components of the Folstein Mini-Mental State Examination, 
showing signs of compromised sensorimotor function. More specifically, he had 
difficulty writing, drawing, or communicating through his hands, and an impaired gait. 
He continued to make sexual requests of nurses during his visit at the hospital. An MRI 
scan revealed a tumor the size of an egg pressing on his orbitofrontal lobe. The 
orbitofrontal lobe is associated with impulse control, sociopathic behavior, acquisition 
and integration of moral knowledge, and social integration
4, 6,11
. After the tumor was 
removed, his sexual misconduct and impulsivity ceased. His sensorimotor function 
returned, and after seven months was deemed as unthreatening to his step-daughter and 
returned home.  
A case such as this may persuade one to believe in causation, and not simply 
correlation, of anti-social or violent behavior and neurological impairment. In the case of 
this man, his aggressive behaviors were ameliorated with the tumor‘s removal. It seems 
that this tumor causing neurological defect is the reason he was unable, despite his will, 
to control himself. His remorse leads one to believe his impulses were stronger than his 
ability to control himself, and his biology was to blame. A trickier case would be that of a 
criminal who has no tumor to be removed, no accident which damaged his or her brain, 
but who expresses a gene or genetic mutation which is linked to aggression, impulsivity, 
19 
 
or antisocial behavior. Deciphering who, or what, is holding responsibility for criminal 
behavior in these cases becomes much murkier. A commonly cited example is the 
MAOA gene, nicknamed ‗the warrior gene‘, which is said to increase the likelihood of 
violent or aggressive behavior. To further confound things, the gene‘s expression has 
been linked to environmental factors, which may be interpreted as an unsafe living 
environment, childhood abuse, or a pregnant mother smoking tobacco during gestation
16
. 
Here a solution for corrective behavior becomes less clear. If such a person were on trial 
for a crime, brain scans, genetic data, and statistics might be used to rationalize his or her 
behavior. It becomes an issue to explore whether or not it‘s appropriate to shift some 
culpability from the individual to his or her neurological abnormalities. 
While behavior is linked to a constellation of factors and influences, there is hope 
scientific data will assist in understanding how these forces link to criminal behavior. 
How the legal system will subsequently engage with criminals in light of this information 
largely depends on how conversations and discussions are conducted between those who 
can speak for the significance of scans and related data, and those embedded in the legal 
system. Therefore it is critical to approach such integration with care to be clear, concise, 
and direct. 
 
Shedding Light on the Shadowy Drives of Behavior 
  Although there are clear limitations on what neuroimaging data can reveal about 
the intangible mind, careful use of neuroimaging can be enlightening. A particular case 
may benefit to describe difficulties an individual has in his decision making processes, 
provide insight into abnormal behavior, or explain changes in personality. When these 
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images are used within the realm of fact, and not stretched beyond truth, they hold the 
opportunity for comprehending (some of) the factors involved in an individual‘s criminal 
behavior. As changes in an individual‘s neurological functioning may result in behavioral 
or cognitive abnormalities, there is much to be understood when determining guilt and 
responsibility for criminal actions which may occur as a result of this change. Could one 
argue ―My brain made me do it‖?  
Perhaps that of the forty year-old man exhibiting uncontrollable sexual urges, 
with a tumor pressing on his orbitofrontal lobe, is an example of when neuroimaging data 
can in fact provide accurate and valid information as to what drove his aggressive 
behavior. There was such a strong correlation between the tumor and his actions, despite 
his will to act otherwise. When it was removed, he seemed to return to his normal and 
healthy state. When the tumor was present, he acted uncharacteristically. There are 
certainly cases where this type of data can be useful to shed light on criminal behavior.  
 A study by Aharoni et al. aimed to understand some of the biological correlates of 
criminal behavior
1
. The study observed the relationship between impulse control, defined 
as a type of behavioral disinhibition, and areas of the brain involved in this process. Of 
the several areas identified as playing a role, particular focus was given to the anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC), an area of the limbic system. The limbic system contains areas of 
the brain that are considered more primal and animalistic- it plays a role in processing 
fight or flight responses, the senses, and survival. One of the areas in particular, the 
amygdala, plays a large role in aggression and processing emotions related to fear. The 
ACC has been associated with learning avoidance and restraint for particular stimuli, 
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processing error, and monitoring conflict. This area also relays information to the frontal 
cortex, facilitating learning.  
In animal and human studies, damage to the ACC has shown changes in 
aggression, disinhibition, and apathy (in humans). ―Indeed, ACC-damaged patients have 
been classed in the ‗acquired psychopathic personality genre‖1. In their study, the group 
tested a group of 96 criminal offenders and 102 non-offenders and measured changes in 
blood flow in the brain, to signify activation using fMRI, while performing tasks relating 
to behavioral impulsivity. Results of the study showed a significant difference in impulse 
control correlated in persons with atypical neural response maps. A large percentage of 
participants with impaired function in the ACC were also rearrested, which may be 
interpreted as failure to learn from one‘s mistakes, conform to social norms, or have 
disregard for other persons. The authors make no claims about causation versus 
correlation, but point out that it confirms the ACC plays a role in decision making, 
aggressive or violent behavior, and may be an area of interest when investigating the 
physiological components of criminal motivation
1
.  
Studies and cases such as this provide support for a neurological dimension of 
criminal behavior. It is something worth investigating, rather than dismissing the 
relationship as unimportant. There is a plethora of literature and experiments that make a 
strong case for a correlation, if nothing else, between neurological abnormalities and 
abnormal, or specifically criminal, behavior. And while discussion of what kinds of legal 
consequences individuals with these kinds of differences should be dealt is a matter for 
politicians, the matter is certainly worth investigating. Perhaps a greater understanding of 
this relationship will lead to more appropriate sentencing of criminals, where the 
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prospects of rehabilitation, treatment, or the likelihood to repeat an offense can be 
considered in the process. Ideally, this kind of knowledge would lead to a higher success 
rate of finding adequate solutions to criminal behavior.  
 
The Risk of Abuse 
 Other cases of criminal behavior seem more of a stretch to rationalize to a 
predominantly neurological cause. There are certain limitations to what this data can tell 
us now, and particular aspects of the mind may always be out of reach to measure by 
technology. There is a concern that if some aspects of criminal behavior are accepted as 
‗defective neural wiring‘ or the blame lies with how the brain is structured, people will 
not be held responsible for their actions. Further, that possibility may inspire some to 
feign neurological disorders to seek lighter sentences for their criminal behavior, and 
argue they were physiologically not able to control themselves. This is not an irrational 
fear, when misuse of scientific data to evade blame already occurs.   
There exists a fear that by permitting any sort of neuroimaging data as evidence in 
the courtroom, it will be misused by the defendant in an effort to lighten his sentence and 
avoid full responsibility for his crime. Some fear the defense could abuse the insanity 
plea by constructing a dishonest argument that his client is mentally unfit to stand trial. 
This was deemed to be the case in 1997 when Vincent Gigante was brought finally to 
trial on charges of racketeering and murder. Gigante was brought to trial as a suspected 
mob boss after his arrest in 1990. By the time of his trial, there were rumors that he had 
been slowly planting seeds to feign insanity as a safeguard in case he was ever convicted. 
He was known to play pinochle with some conspirers over the course of the past 20 
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years, where they ironed out details of how to avoid arrest. Yet even before feeling the 
pressure of getting charged, in 1969 Gigante began receiving diagnosis of schizophrenia 
from reputable psychiatrists. His primary psychiatrist, Eugene D‘Adamo, testified that 
during his decade and a half treatment of Vincent Gigante, he received multiple 
diagnoses of schizophrenia, Alzheimer's, and dementia, to name a few
31,32
.  
 When Vincent Gigante was brought to trial in 1997 for the belief that he was 
running a crime syndicate, it was widely believed that he was feigning insanity. During 
the 1990‘s several turncoat witnesses provided testimony on Gigante‘s lucid state of 
mind, and openly testified that not only was he their superior, but he would not have been 
promoted past captain had any member of the inner circle thought him insane. However, 
several psychiatrists were brought in to confirm the diagnosis of Gigante‘s dementia. The 
defense attempted to admit PET scans as evidence of dementia, but these scans were 
ruled inadmissible due to lack of baseline studies and limited number of controls. 
Interesting to note is that Jonathan Brodie, an expert in neurological scanning, believed 
the PET scans to be inconclusive, and even went so far to say that they were inconsistent 
with clinical studies of dementia. Regardless of expert opinion, Gigante was convicted of 
racketeering and sentenced to 12 years of prison
31
.  Five years later, after being indicted 
on charges of obstruction of justice and racketeering, Vincent Gigante admitted to 
employing close relatives to help him feign insanity and mislead psychiatrists
31
.  
 This case is a brilliant example of the defense attempting to exploit the legal 
system in place that checks against mental illness and its role in responsibility. Not only 
was fraudulent intent admitted to after the trial, but the legitimacy of psychiatrists and 
24 
 
neurological scanning experts were brought into question
b
. Jonathan Brodie, the expert 
who testified against the legitimacy of the PET scans claiming dementia, is an exemplar 
of the type of expert to be desired in court proceedings. Even when the popular opinion 
among the testifying psychiatrists was a diagnosis of schizophrenia and dementia, Brodie 
gave an honest opinion of the case and recognized what the scans indicated, rather than 
claiming a definitive diagnosis. 
 
Chapter 3 
What Shall We Do? The Honest Broker Approach 
There is cogency to the belief that neuroimaging can be an important tool in 
understanding criminal behavior. It is also perfectly reasonable, and important, to have 
hesitations about its use and implications. Both of these perspectives have validity to 
them. I argue that one is not superior to the other; rather they both contain pieces of a 
complementary truth. Rather than opposing each other, and holding that one side is right 
and the other is wrong, I suggest that we should embrace both the use of neuroimaging as 
evidence, and be cautious of its limits and misuse. There are valid cases when 
neuroimaging can shed light on a case of violent behavior, as discussed in the first half of 
Chapter Two.  
As far as determining whether or not neuroimaging can produce anything relevant 
in determining personal responsibility in matters of criminal justice, the question moves 
beyond mere science and becomes an issue involving the roles and interactions of expert-
scientists and the individuals making decisions in light of this information. What 
becomes clear is the transfer of information from the informers to decision makers, who 
                                                          
b
 It‘s interesting to note there the distrust was of the scientists; not the PET scans themselves.  
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are applying this information, is paramount in how the decision makers determine the 
pertinence of neuroimaging data to the responsibility of defendants. It‘s a dual effort to 
understand the circumstances that merit neuroimaging as a means of determining 
responsibility, moral culpability, and criminality of persons on trial. The experts of 
relevant fields provide knowledge of what the scans could be indicating, while this 
information is incorporated into the process of sentencing and determining guilt and 
responsibility. 
The issue that becomes most important when contemplating the validity of 
neuroimaging to make such deductions is to make sure that there is a clear and accurate 
presentation of scientific fact. There needs to be an understanding and respect about its 
limits in order to avoid cases of misuse, and navigate a proper use of neuroimaging as 
evidence. Ideally, the scientist-informer is not engaged in a political campaign, or 
participating in some sort of work where he would be inclined to lead a decision maker to 
a particular belief. The information should be presented in such a way that allows the 
other party to draw conclusions independently. 
 In order to use neuroimaging data in an appropriate and accurate way, it is most 
important there be what Roger Pielke deems an ‗honest broker‘ approach when marrying 
science and politics. There needs to be a nonbiased approach in communicating on the 
meaning and limitations of neuroimaging, free of herding toward a particular conclusion. 
In order to safeguard against an agenda of a particular political outcome, establishing a 
more definite line between the role of science and the role of the political should take 
place. When seeking counsel of scientists in order to make a decision, it‘s common that 
the lines between scientists as informers and inquirers making political decisions become 
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blurred. The role of both parties must be clearly defined in order to succeed in this 
endeavor
25
. 
 In his book The Honest Broker, Roger Pielke presents four different modes of 
interaction scientists can have when dealing with politicians
25
. They fall on a spectrum of 
two axes, one being by modes of democracy, and the other on relationship to science. I 
would simplify this to say the categories range from how interested each group is to act in 
the political sphere, how much influence they would like to have, crossed with expertise 
and personal participation in science. The most scientific and least interested in its 
political consequence is to act as a pure scientist. To interact with policy as a pure 
scientist is to give purely empirical data, which has the downfall of not allowing the 
information to be accessible in a way that one can make higher level decisions with it. 
The pure scientist is uninterested in the outcomes of how the information is used, but to 
the fault that the information is not palatable and does not connect the information with 
its implications in practice. The pure scientist approach is very ‗hands off‘ with helping 
someone to understand what the information means. It leaves plenty of raw scientific 
fact, but no way to translate that into a means of decision making for the non-expert, and 
no assistance navigating through it. Someone acting as a pure scientist approach is less 
concerned with ensuring the other party has a comprehensive understanding of 
information, and may not fully comprehend what information to filter through and deem 
relevant to the seeker‘s goals. 
A science arbiter shares a similar preference for science, but also sees the need for 
the science to be accessible to policy makers. Although the science arbiter does not want 
to be intimately involved in the decision making process, people in this category do want 
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to interact with the policy makers though. They often work on projects that are useful to 
and produce results that can be applicable for a policy, rather than focus on normative 
issues. Science arbiters are often not scientists in practice, but may take the form of 
organizations or individuals who want to answer questions posed by policy makers. A 
science arbiter tends to want to remain above political debate, instead preferring to act as 
an informer for such deliberations. The fault with this approach is that it typically results 
in becoming involved in politics anyway, whether it be through bribery or personal 
incentive. It becomes difficult without incentive to work within the system as a simple 
advisor, when a science arbiter doesn‘t really have an interest in getting involved in the 
chaos of politics
25
.  
The third mode of interlacing science and politics falls in the category of issue 
advocate. Issue advocates use scientific research for a specific political agenda, aligning 
with a particular interest group who wants to advance its interest through application of 
science. Essentially, they use science to advocate a particular cause and policy outcome. 
This group gets as deeply involved in politics as it can, with the goal of affecting policy 
and creating change. Pielke argues that often times people end up falling into this group 
when they become involved in the intersection of science and politics from any angle, as 
it‘s a powerful force in this intersection.  
Issue advocates fall into this mode of interaction in multiple ways. Pielke 
observed a sentiment amongst scientists that ‗politicians would act differently, if only the 
understood science‘. It becomes tempting to share the understanding one has of science, 
so that society and politics accurately reflect contemporary understanding. Along with 
society and political bodies encouraging scientists to become engaged in politics, there is 
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a certain sense of responsibility some scientists might feel for bringing scientific 
understanding to other realms of society. Not to mention, science carries a grand 
authority to society‘s perception of truth. Scientists are esteemed as experts on a prima 
facie basis by laymen. Some become science arbiters because of the power such a role 
can hold, which is an approach susceptible to corruption. Facts may be twisted or bent in 
order to achieve the political agenda of the particular group acting as advocates, which 
makes for a poor counsel when seeking truth
25
. 
Whether or not a scientist‘s intentions are nonpolitical, it can become difficult to 
not become politicized. When speaking on hot issues, someone may become 
unintentionally aligned with a particular politician‘s campaign simply by speaking in a 
way that is in step with the politician‘s ideals. This creates a risky environment for 
scientists to speak honestly about their research and opinions, particularly in a public 
format. What may result is polarization within the scientific field, where some are 
interested in working in a public sphere, and others are not simply because a topic has 
political significance. This situation is all the more reason an honest broker relationship 
between politics and science, with clearly defined boundaries, is necessary. In the honest 
broker approach, a scientist refrains from real political involvement. The scientist‘s role 
remains to be an informer, and does not engage in the decision making process. That is 
left to the politicians. The scientist‘s role is clearly defined as a broker of information; a 
translator. His or her job is defined as one that provides an accurate interpretation of 
complex scientific material rather than one that advises what to do with that information. 
Refraining from advice over political decisions is necessary, as that is the politician‘s 
duty.  
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Maintaining the boundaries between the duties of the scientist and duties of the 
politician is key in reestablishing legitimacy in respective fields, and progressing towards 
an appropriate integration of science and policy. This allows duties to be delegated in the 
ways that are truly reflective of each party‘s responsibility and qualifications. Such an 
approach is also necessary in understanding what each party needs in order to reach a 
consensus about scientific information. The scientist need not be the issue advocate and 
promote a particular use of the science. Instead, the scientist best serves as an informer, 
an honest broker, in order to allow science to speak for itself. What becomes of it in a 
political sense is left to the politicians. And what becomes of policy regarding such 
science should lie with politicians; not scientists.  
 I argue that neuroimaging data should be used in relevant cases, where the data 
can provide legitimate information about partial influences of criminal behavior. Each 
case must be individually investigated to understand whether or not neuroimaging data is 
relevant enough to be used as evidence. Furthermore, it‘s important to have a firm 
understanding about the limits of what neuroimaging can say about a person‘s decision 
making capabilities, and it‘s important to take necessary steps to prevent misuse. Whether 
or not this data results in a difference in sentencing is absolutely not the responsibility of 
the scientist. In fact, it would serve all parties for the scientist to avoid conversation about 
what to do with the data. Maintaining clearly defined boundaries between the role of the 
expert scientist and the policy maker is critical for clarity and truth to remain between 
both groups.  
 Second, in order to achieve these ends, an honest broker approach would best 
serve the goal of an accurate portrayal of neuroscience for the courtroom. This allows the 
30 
 
science to be communicated in a way that is most palatable and accessible to courts and 
judges, allowing them to make an informed decision by seeking the expert‘s council 
without sway over how the information is used. Ideally, an expert scientist willing to take 
such an approach, who also possesses ample communication skills, would be able to help 
understand when neuroimaging data would be appropriate in particular cases.  
 
Chapter 4 
An Exemplary Dialogue 
The following is a hypothetical dialogue between an expert in criminal 
psychology and neuroscience, and a criminal judge seeking a non-biased and reliable 
discussion of neuroimaging‘s applications for understanding criminal behavior.  This 
format will allow me to exhibit several key dimensions of what the honest brokering of 
neuroimaging would look like, while highlighting the philosophical issues involved. It is 
not meant to propose a literal conversation, but rather a thought experiment that engages 
readers in questions of how we hold criminals responsible for their actions in the process 
of sentencing, how neuroimaging can play a role in that process, and exemplify honest 
brokering. 
 
 Judge (J): Thank you for coming today. I keep getting questions about the permissibility 
and accuracy of using brain scans in the courtroom for criminal trials. I’m hoping you 
can bring some light to the science behind these pictures and data for me. 
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Expert (E): Absolutely. It‘s a tricky field of information to navigate, even as someone 
well versed in neuroscience and psychology
c
.  
J: I will appreciate your opinions and explanations as an established and experienced 
figure in the field. If you don’t mind, I’d like to begin with asking about what the 
differences between various types of scans are. I know they measure different 
characteristics, like electrical signals or blood flow. Can you give me a general 
description of what they’re evaluating?  
E: Yes, you are certainly right about that! There are indeed a variety of scans which 
target specific qualities and phenomena. One of the most common types of imaging to be 
used to peer inside the brain is magnetic resonance imaging, or MRI. This technique 
employs a machine to emit magnetic and radio waves in order to create an image of 
tissues. This works by gathering very specific information about the unique composition 
of the targeted tissues and cells. The machine does so by interacting with the very 
fundamental building blocks- hydrogen atoms. Waves emitted from the MRI excite 
hydrogen atoms in the body, which are comprise everything from cell membranes, to 
water, to proteins. The unique ‗fingerprint‘ of how these atoms are arranged into their 
respective molecules can be extracted from how the waves interact with the molecules. 
This comes from the distinctive ways the hydrogen atoms in different arrangement get 
excited from the MRI waves, and then return to their normal state. This transition of 
energy gives off very specific information, which the MRI machine uses to put together 
an image that reveals minute differences in cell types and composition. Due to the 
sensitivity of MRI machines, they are frequently used as a first choice for imaging, 
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 From the beginning, the expert acknowledges the complexity of the field and sympathizes with the judge.  
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particularly when looking for tumors, structural deficits, neurodegeneration, or 
infections
2
. 
J: What do you mean by ‘exciting’ the atoms? 
E: When atoms are ‗excited‘, they contain more energy than their normal, resting state, 
which is called the ground state. The electrons circulating around the atom‘s core are 
moving at a faster pace, where they may reach a higher orbital level with the extra 
energy. A single hydrogen atom typically has one electron. In its ground state, that 
electron revolves around the hydrogen atom‘s center, or nucleus, in the closest and lowest 
possible orbit. In the case of our MRI scanner, the waves the machine emits raises the 
energy levels of the hydrogen atoms, and thereby excites them. The machine records the 
patterns of energy and how they rise and fall to describe different types of cellular 
compositions, using these details to create a finely detailed image. So being excited 
means to energize the atoms for a brief time; which is utilized by the MRI to observe how 
the energy is released back to be assembled into a coherent picture.  
J: Alright, I think I got it. I had no idea the pictures are taken from using atoms! So now 
what’s the difference between an MRI and an fMRI? 
E: An fMRI, abbreviated for functional magnetic resonance imaging, measures changes 
in blood flow by tracking the movement of oxygenated blood. These images aim to 
measure activity, or function, of brain areas by linking an increased demand for 
oxygenated blood as a signifier of increased neural activity. The idea is that when an area 
of the brain is involved in a particular mental process, because it is active there will be a 
greater consumption of oxygen. Instead of exciting and monitoring changes in hydrogen 
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atoms, fMRI scans track the oxygen on red blood cells and create a series of time-lapse 
images to show where oxygenated blood is flowing.  
J: So what is going on during this time lapse? I’ve seen these types of images before, but 
what’s going on that changes blood flow from one area to another?  
E: That‘s an excellent question. So typically, this type of scan will be used to measure 
how a subject relates to a certain task, phenomenon, or idea. Sometimes they will 
perform a task to measure motor control or coordination. Other times, they may watch a 
screen that produces images, a story, or words to observe a response. These images on the 
screen may be targeted to activate certain areas of the brain associated with emotional 
responses, memory, or other types of recognition. But the idea is to measure the changes 
that occur in the brain over time as that image or stimulus is introduced to the subject. 
J: So let me see if I understand, the MRI takes a static snapshot, and the fMRI monitors 
change? Kind of like a photo versus a roll of movie film
d
? 
E: Yes, you got it! Another type of imaging that looks at change in blood flow is near 
infrared spectroscopy; NIS. Do you recall the electromagnetic spectrum? 
J: Yes, with radio waves on one end and gamma rays at the other, and visible light 
somewhere in the middle.  
E: Precisely. Right before red visible light waves is the infrared frequency. Humans can 
sense some of this energy as heat, or thermal radiation. NIS measures how infrared 
energy is absorbed and transferred in the brain when emitted from a machine. The ‗near‘ 
part of its name implies that it is used to gather information from the layers of tissue 
closest to the surface. It doesn‘t glean much data on movements deep inside the brain.  
                                                          
d
 In this sentence, the judge is checking that he has an adequate understanding of the information the expert 
provided. Taking these breaks in conversation exemplifies the kind of clarity honest brokering aims to 
achieve. 
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J: So why would someone use NIS rather than fMRI or MRI if the images and data aren’t 
as comprehensive? 
E: The advantage of NIS is because it‘s so mild, non-invasive, and can be portable, it‘s 
suitable for infants or the disabled. The machine‘s frequency is safe to use on sensitive 
people and animals, and is much simpler to use. The apparatus is about the size of an 
early model, bulky laptop, with a hand-held device that emits the infrared signal and 
receives the response of the tissues. So it‘s portable, convenient to transport, and 
inexpensive; unlike the MRI and fMRI. This can make it more accessible to a greater 
population of people. In less sensitive cases, it‘s more commonly used as a complement 
to other types of images, rather than alone
17
.  
J: That sounds reasonable. Let’s keep discussing types of scanse. 
E: Alright, let‘s talk about CT scans, or computed tomography. This is a technique that 
uses X-rays to put together cross-sectional pictures of the brain. This series of images can 
be run through a computer to assemble a three-dimensional model. The resolution isn‘t as 
high as other types of imaging like MRI, but it is still useful for diagnostic medical 
testing
14
. Positron emission tomography, abbreviated PET, also forms a three 
dimensional image, but uses radioactive tracers. Radioactive tracers are a type of 
substance introduced to the body and have little ‗flags‘ or markers of a radioactive atom. 
By using sensitive radio-detective equipment to locate where these tracers are, 
information about how the body is circulating, using, and processing certain resources 
may be obtained. Oftentimes the radioactive ions are inserted in a specific type of protein 
or molecule that is part of a targeted metabolic pathway, or will be used by a specific part 
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 Again, the judge is guiding the direction of the conversation in his endeavor gain an understanding of the 
science at hand. The role of the expert in honest brokering is to guide the judge through literature to give 
him an adequate supply of information to satisfy his needs. 
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of the body to ‗light up‘ that area. These little markers thus may be abstracted into a 
three-dimensional picture.  
J: Wait, are you telling me people are having radioactive materials injected or ingested 
into their bodies? Is this dangerous? 
E: The radioactive materials used are generally mild and stabilize, or decompose, quickly 
because of their intentional use in the body. They are often in such small doses, that they 
hold nearly negligible effects on tissues. These radioactive isotopes don‘t emit the 
disruptive, ionizing radiation, which is more damaging to tissues
26
. Honestly, I would be 
more concerned with wearing sunscreen to protect yourself from the sun than to worry 
about one of these isotopes used for imaging. 
J: I guess it’s just alarming to hear the word ‘radioactive’. I typically think of mutations 
and disasters from nuclear plants. 
E:  It seems to be a common sentiment. But to change this fear, there has to come a shift 
in how people perceive radiation. And changing the perception of what radiation is 
requires a reconceptualization of its definition to be more complete and accurate. It 
encompasses more than just carcinogenic energies. Sometimes it‘s harmful, sometimes 
it‘s helpful. It just depends on the detailsf.  
J: I can see that. Okay, what else do we have? 
E: There are two more, which I can explain briefly. I know some of this stuff is complex, 
so just bear with me!
g
 Alright, let‘s talk about magnetoencephalography first. MEG also 
                                                          
f
 This exchange provides an opportunity to debunk some fears and misconceptions about science embedded 
in society. 
g
 Again, the expert here acknowledges the complexity of neuroimaging, and at the same time tries to 
provide a simple and understandable summary of a vast field of science. Honest brokering acts as a means 
to guide a non-expert through existing literature and knowledge of the complex science, providing enough 
information to give a basic understanding without being overwhelming or going into extraneous detail.  
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measures changes or activity in the brain. This technique uses magnets too, but this time 
it picks up on the magnetic fields that the brain itself generates, rather than creating a 
magnetic output. Are you familiar with how neurons communicate or send messages to 
each other? 
J: Do they zap each other with electricity?  
E: That‘s pretty good! Electricity is part of it, in general it‘s a coupling of both electric 
and chemical impulses that allows and directs currents flowing from one neuron to 
another. So as these impulses pass, there is a change in magnetism due to the passing of 
electric charges. The change in electric charge creates a weak magnetic field in the brain. 
Does that make sense?
h
 
J: Yes, this is all very technical and very small to imagine, but I’m still following. 
E: Alright. Now just as an fMRI, MEG measures activity and changes in the brain over a 
period of time. So the subject may be performing a task or viewing images on a screen 
while the MEG machine is measuring responses in the brain. But unlike fMRI, the 
machine is measuring the electricity generated from neurons that are firing with activity. 
This is a very weak current, so the tests must be conducted in a secured location protected 
against interfering energies like phones and background noises. There are usually barriers 
around the room to prevent distortion
9
. 
J: And what is the difference between measuring blood flow versus these electrical 
impulses? Is one better than the other? 
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 Unlike the pure scientist approach, honest brokering takes interest in making sure the non-expert is 
adequately grasping the information and is not getting lost. 
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E: I‘m glad you asked. There is a current debatei surrounding this issue, because it‘s not 
certain that increased blood flow means increased activation. I‘d like to point out there is 
some ambiguity around whether or not more blood flow in a particular area of one photo 
means the neurons are activated. But measuring electrical impulses does measure 
engagement of certain neurons and parts of the brain with certainty. It‘s not uncommon to 
use both methods to piece together a complementary picture of neural activity. The 
advantage of MEG scans is that they are able to track changes much more accurately and 
quickly than fMRI. MEG machines detect actions at a scale of around 10 milliseconds, 
whereas fMRI operates on a scale of a few hundred milliseconds
4
. However, MRI and 
fMRI have better resolution, particularly for structures that are deep in the brain like the 
hypothalamus. So there are advantages and disadvantages to both. For any individual 
case, unique characteristics and goals of that particular observation will be taken into 
account to determine which scan will be more appropriate. It‘s kind of a task of weighing 
all the distinct factors of the case, and determining what‘s going to yield the most 
relevant data. 
J: I had no idea there were so many differences and factors to consider! Nor that there 
was any sort of debate going on. 
E: Yes, in fact another type of scan that is commonly contrasted against these others is 
electroencephalography, or EEG. This type of scan also measures electrical impulses, but 
instead of creating an image of the brain, an EEG produces a read out of these impulses 
as a wave function. So this one is quite different from the others in terms of what kind of 
picture of the brain is produced. An EEG does not use a scanner, but measures electrical 
activity in the brain using a series of electrodes placed on the scalp of the subject. 
                                                          
i
 Another characteristic of honest brokering is highlighting topics of uncertainty and debate within the field. 
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J: Yes, I think I’ve seen images of that before. That’s when a few dozen wires are stuck 
all over someone’s head with pads right? It looks kind of funny. 
E: Exactly. The advantage of all those wires is that they can be less intimidating than an 
MRI machine. This could be useful for subjects with claustrophobia, or people who don‘t 
want to be exposed to any sort of magnetic fields.  
J: So what does measuring brain waves tell us? 
E: First, there are several different types of brain waves. Delta waves are deep, slow 
waves observed in sleep and infants. Theta waves are also more prevalent in younger 
persons, such as children, and also associated with relaxed, meditative states. Alpha 
waves are the types of patterns that occur with the day-to-day, relaxed conscious state. 
There are couple different subtypes and classifications of alpha waves, but for now we 
can just acknowledge they correspond to different types of activities. But it‘s important to 
note that they don‘t always signify being awake; people in a coma still produce alpha 
waves. The final major category of neural wave patterns is the beta waves. These are the 
shortest, quickest form of wave. They are typically associated with more intense activity, 
such as thinking, problem-solving, or engagement with tasks at hand
22
. So these four 
major types, ranging from the longest and slowest to the shortest and fastest, are the 
result of different ‗symphonies‘ of neural networks running together. Does this make 
sense? 
J: I guess I just don’t understand how the differences result j. What is going on in the 
brain that produces alpha waves versus beta waves? At first I thought you were talking 
                                                          
j
 The non-expert being straightforward when further explanation or clarification is needed fosters the kind 
of mutual engagement idea in honest brokering and leaving the non-expert well informed enough in the 
science to make decisions about its application.  
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about being awake versus sleeping, but then you said people in a coma may still have the 
alpha waves.  
E: Oh, pardon me; I must clarify on a particular point. The brain isn‘t only producing one 
type of wave consistently or continuously. They often occur together or in sequence, 
fluctuating with the dynamic states and processes of the mind. The EEG wave patterns 
are representational of the collective wave of electrical impulses resulting as neurons 
firing together. But highly disrupted waves, or waves that don‘t match a subject‘s 
activities, can signify a disharmony or malfunction in the brain. EEG is therefore a 
common tool used to diagnose and treat epilepsy, where neurons fire rapidly and 
chaotically, and can lead to seizures. So when looking at these graphs an ideal pattern is 
one that‘s appropriate and harmonious for the corresponding behavior or task of the 
subject. The different types of brain waves results from how much energy the brain is 
using, and in what ways. As mentioned, delta waves are mostly observed in a deep, 
relaxed sleep. The brain is not processing stimuli or emotions, solving puzzles, or 
reacting to the environment. Such tasks require more activity and activation of the brain. 
Beta waves, the shorter, more intense waves, result from coupled activation of memory 
systems, language, logic and abstract thought, emotions, and a variety of other areas to 
work together. It requires focus and attention, and typically signifies active cognitive 
engagement.  
J: Okay, so I understand now. Is it kind of like the waves move from delta to beta with 
greater amounts of thinking and more of the brain being used? 
E: Kind of, that‘s a simplified way to think about it. But remember, sometimes this isn‘t 
true, particularly in the case of neural malfunction. Not only in the case of epilepsy, but 
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abnormal patterns may be observed in psychological issues like depression, attention 
deficit disorder, or schizophrenia. 
J: What do you think EEG measurements have to do with criminal behavior? It seems 
like some of the other types of scans that produce images can reveal more about what’s 
not working right, if you will. If EEG scans are dependent on thoughts, and thoughts can 
change, what kind of conclusions can be made about a person based on EEG readings? 
E: The recordings can reveal some patterns linked to behaviors and motivations toward 
criminal actions. They are able to perceive compulsive or aggressive thought patterns, 
rage, anxiety and panic attacks, and explosive reactions. When subjects are presented 
with certain stimuli, the neuronal patterns that result can be interpreted as inappropriate; 
whether too intense or unsynchronized. This kind of result can help one understand what 
kinds of reactions a subject is experiencing to certain situations or ideas. So the use of 
this approach can detect an inclination to react in violent or asocial ways
k
. 
J: That kind of talk kind of makes me worried 
l
. Can you tell what someone is thinking 
based off of this information? 
E: No, and I think this is a common fear or assumption people have when scientists talk 
about data from any type of scan or image in relation to behavior. There is no way 
individual thoughts can be abstracted from these kinds of measurements. We are truly in 
the dark as to how to even imagine obtaining that kind of detailed information. Secondly, 
everybody‘s brain is unique as their person. A conglomeration of genetics, experiences, 
inclinations, habits, and more all make everyone‘s brain unique enough to where that sort 
                                                          
k
 This exchange approaches the limits of the respective roles between the two parties, but does not cross it. 
The judge‘s question does not ask what to do per se with neuroimaging, but instead asks what scientific 
understanding can bring to the nature of criminality. The judge is not asking how they should be used, but 
rather where the limits of science meet application.  
l
 Honest brokering also fosters an openness to confess concerns one party may have. 
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of ‗listening in‘ to someone‘s thoughts is not possible. There is no identified and definite 
neural path or pattern that correlates to a particular idea, like ―I‘m hungry‖ or ―I want to 
kill my wife‖. This type of acuity is nothing we have a capability of, nor an iota of how to 
approach.  
J: So now that we’ve established a foundation of what these scans are measuring, let’s 
move on to what the data means. What can they tell us about a person’s behavior or 
capacity for rational thought? What does it mean when one area ‘lights up’ or not in the 
images? 
E: Well, let me answer this carefully. As mentioned, this can reveal abnormalities in 
brain function, which we correlate to abnormal behavior. It‘s a pretty touchy subject to 
discuss correlation versus causation. I am not interested in making claims over whether 
thoughts produce physical reactions, like electrical impulses and chemical release, or it‘s 
a release of chemicals and activation of certain neurons that result in thoughts and 
internal experience. That leads to a serious debate about free will, reductionism, the 
nature of the mind, and metaphysical topics I don‘t feel qualified to opine on. But what 
does seem less debatable is that there are correlations between quantifiable neural 
processes, and certain types of behavior. There is evidence that there are particular 
regions of the brain which correspond to specific mental processes and capacities. Also, 
damage or deficits in these areas have observable changes in behavior. So we can start to 
make correlations between behavior and neuronal qualities, but we must be careful not to 
cross into a state of mind where we predict what someone will or won‘t do based on their 
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neural map. This data can be used as something that influences probability, but not 
something that determines outcome
m
.  
J: I guess what I’m wondering now is how strong that probability is. How much weight 
should I give to this type of data? I understand more about how these scans work and 
what the pictures are measuring, but I still don’t know what that means in regards to how 
responsible a criminal is for his actions if he has an abnormal brain. 
E: And here we get to the core issue! I think perhaps to best answer this question, we 
should quickly review what areas of the brain are responsible for rational decision 
making and moral psychology.  
J: Oh my. Good thing I’m taking notes, there are a lot of definitions to keep track of! 
E: How are you holding up with all this information?  
J: Pretty well, I feel as though I’m grasping everything, but it’s a lot to take in. I haven’t 
started to link it all together yet, so I feel like I’m still assembling the big picture.  
E: Is there anything else I can clarify for you, or that we can do differently to make this 
easier? 
J: I think you do a great job of describing things in a way that I can understand them. I 
know there’s a lot more to what you’re saying, but even the short version is very helpful. 
E: Maybe we should take a short lunch break to digest some food while your brain 
digests this information. 
J: Ha! I can agree to that! In ending discussion 
 
                                                          
m
 In this response, the expert very clearly maintains to his role as an informer of science- leaving 
extrapolation to the judge. He very carefully avoids making claims outside the application and limits of 
science. He even goes as far as identifying the question as one that must be answered carefully and which 
crosses into grey areas in understanding. By doing so, the expert is adhering to the kind of honest brokering 
that portrays the facts of science as well as respecting his role as the informer, not the decision maker.  
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J: Alright, so now I feel refreshed and ready to continue. I think a break was necessary. 
E: Yes, in fact, from a neurological standpoint breaks are important for information to be 
encoded into long-term memory systems. So I‘m glad we took one now before we 
continue into our next discussion. 
J: Yes, you were about to give me a nutshell version of what different brain regions are 
responsible for. At least, the ones that may be relevant to criminal behavior.  
E: Okay, let‘s get started! There are some basic parts of the brain that humans and other 
animals share, but the outer layers, are believed to be a more recent development in the 
history and development of species. This outer layer as a whole is called the neocortex, 
which roughly translates from ‗new bark‘ in Greek. It refers to a layer that is exclusively 
found in mammals. There are different layers within the neocortex, with humans having a 
more sophisticated and complex map of neurons comprising these layers. In the 
neocrotex of humans, we observe characteristic capacities for language, emotion, logic, 
spatial reasoning, and other forms of higher cognition. The neocortex of mammals in 
general share functions like motor control and sensory processing, which pertains to 
interpreting the world around an organism through the five senses. There are subdivisions 
of this region, but we can talk about general and pertinent properties in humans. Do you 
have any questions thus far? 
J: Just what you mean by ‘motor control’ n. 
E: Motor control means movement, like walking and having command over one‘s 
muscles.  
J: Okay, got it.  
                                                          
n
 Note that in general, the expert does not use a lot of heavy scientific jargon. The honest broker would 
prioritize making his descriptions palatable enough for a non-expert.  
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E:  Alright, good! So there are a lot of divisions and subdivisions here, but I will provide 
summative and concise versions for convenience and time. If you would like me to 
provide greater depth, please don‘t hesitate to stop meo.  
J: Thank you. 
E: There is an area of the brain call the prefrontal cortex, which more or less is the area 
that sits behind your forehead. This area, abbreviated as PFC, is further divided into 
regions that I think are particularly relevant for your understanding. The anterior 
cingulate cortex relates to empathy. The dorsolateral PFC is involved in reasoning. The 
ventrolateral PFC plays a large role in inhibiting behaviors, filtering impulsivity or 
inappropriate actions. The ventromedial PFC has an intriguing role in the process of 
weighing morals, ethical decision making, and contemplation. And the orbital PFC is 
related to regret and understanding consequences of one‘s actions18,20,27. These are very, 
very shorthanded descriptions. I‘d like to really stress to you that these regions are 
involved in innumerable processes. Likewise, behaviors and thoughts are not localized or 
occur in just one area either. They incorporate a variety of different areas and pathways. I 
think this is very important to keep in mind was we continue our discussion
p
.  
J: Alright, but I feel kind of conflicted now. On one hand you’re associating areas with 
certain behaviors, on the other it sounds like what your saying is to not take these 
associations too seriously. So what kind of legitimacy can I hold to these associations? 
                                                          
o
 The expert once again making a direct effort to ensure his explanation is informative enough to equip the 
judge with necessary details for thorough understanding, but also invites further questioning and discussion 
as the judge feels fit. This is an example of honest brokering where the expert is acting offering his service 
as  guide, but allowing the judge to dictate the conversation‘s direction.   
p
 Once again the expert emphasizes the limits of science, and cautions to respect those limits.  
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E: Alright, I suppose I just wanted to gloss over some important details
q
. What we know 
is that from a history of collecting data on injuries, experiments, and birth defects, there is 
a relationship between these areas of the brain and certain behaviors. My precautionary 
note relates to that causation versus correlation debate, and also leaves room for the 
myriad other factors which influence behavior. Environmental conditions, learning how 
to process emotion and personal resilience, free will, hormones, and even diet can impact 
how someone acts or reacts in a given situation. A list of factors is illimitable, and the 
ways they influence any one person and any specific situation is exponentially expansive. 
So I don‘t want to lead you to believe that neuronal defects always or never result in a 
specific behavior. Particularly actions of criminal nature, where there are serious 
repercussions for one‘s actions.  
J: Okay, I respect that. Of course, the main question is how all of this does relate to 
criminal behaviors; criminal thought too I suppose. But I’m starting to feel as though 
getting answers from neurological imaging or data isn’t as straightforward as I hoped.  
E: Yes, it‘s not black-and-white. As someone who is searching for answers, I just want to 
caution against unfounded or dogmatic assumptions from these scans as I say things like 
‗A decreased volume of grey matter in the prefrontal cortex has been associated with 
increased psychopathic traits or test scores‘18. Appreciation for the word ‗associated‘, in 
its full definition, is necessary. I don‘t want to pass along misconceptions. 
                                                          
q
 Open conversation of conflict in literature, personal understanding, and the limits of their roles continues 
the honest brokering approach.  
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J: Alright, I see you’re very cautious to not make any definitive claimsr . So let’s carry on 
with the associations of different areas of the brain and capacity for moral reasoning or 
criminal behavior. I assure you I’ll keep myself a little skeptical. 
E: Haha, I don‘t mean to beat the point into the ground so hard, it‘s just a struggle I 
commonly encounter when talking to people- within and outside of the field
s
.  
J: I understand. It seems like you’re kind of isolated by this kind of expertise and the 
degrees of separation from non-scientific understanding. But I appreciate the ways in 
which you’re able to describe this information to me!t  So let’s continue with some of 
these brain areas. What else is there besides the prefrontal cortex?  
E: Thank you, I‘m very pleased this meeting seems to be carrying on successfully. Now 
there are a few more structures I‘d like to go over, which I think are relevant to your line 
of work. One is a structure call the amygdala. This little bundle of neurons plays a variety 
of important roles, from hormonal regulation to memory. One of its functions relates to 
emotional responses such as fear and anger, emotional memory, along with recognizing 
and identifying emotional facial cues in others. Many studies have found correlations of 
amygdala dysfunction and asocial behavior. For example, one study observed volume 
changes and hyperactivity of the amygdala of abused children, and has been associated 
with their increased inclination toward inappropriate and violent reactions
8
. There is also 
an extensive body of literature that has found many psychopathic criminals display 
abnormal function of structures involved in emotion, behavior, memory, impulsivity, and 
                                                          
r
 The judge displaying respect to the scientist for not straying from his role as informer creates the kind of 
atmosphere that allows the honest brokering technique to thrive.  
s
 Likewise, openly discussing some of the challenges that the expert encounters in his efforts to act as an 
informant helps engage in the type of honest brokering necessary for successful translation and application 
of scientific understanding for the judge to make secondary decisions.  
t
 This kind of explicit comment is to show understanding between the two parties of their respective roles.   
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motivation; such as the amygdala, hippocampus, and PFC. We can observe these 
neurological differences in brain scans. And as we study more and more socio- and 
psychopaths, we – or more specifically, those such as yourself – are challenged to 
understand what degree of control or responsibility criminals have if their brains are 
abnormal.  
J: Well as you’ve made clear, there is a difference between correlation and causation. So 
back to my question before our lunch break: How can I approach using scans as 
evidence which show a criminal has abnormal neural patterns or structures? What 
should I keep in mind, or how can I most appropriately and accurately make decisions 
for someone with compromised neurological functioning?  
E: In my opinion, start with the facts. Take things for what they are. What do you know 
for sure? There is an individual who is engaging in violent or otherwise criminal 
behavior. This is indubitable; otherwise he/she wouldn‘t be in front of you! Next, if you 
feel it‘s appropriate, take a look at the scans. Now you know what each one is measuring. 
So do you see a tumor, lesion, or other abnormality? Are you working with a structural 
measure, or one showing function over time? What type of abnormality is it? Now this is 
just my opinion, but I think this is where you have to decide how much you feel this is 
influencing the behavior. You may be more inclined, for instance, to be sympathetic 
toward someone with a large tumor pressurizing an area correlated with rational decision 
making. Maybe you don‘t find another case of irregular blood flow as convincing.  
I think it will be important to make sure to take into account all the individual 
characteristics of that particular person, and his or her case. Qualia such as personal 
history, the nature or onset of their neurological abnormality, and their demeanor in court 
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are all important. Signs of remorse and comprehension of their action‘s severity will be 
important to look for when considering recidivism. All of these factors and more come 
together to drive one‘s actions and motivations. It‘s important to contemplate how they 
affect a person‘s comprehension of legal and social rules, and the ability to function in 
society. You must weave all these influences together to determine how this person 
should be held accountable for his or her actions. If I were to drive one point in 
particular, it‘s to give each case its proper and respectable attention. Make sure you 
weigh factors together as a whole for an individual, rather than isolate or prioritize one 
characteristic and automatically assume it belongs to a particular type of behavior or 
disorder. With as many forces at hand, and as complicated as human behavior is, I would 
suggest approaching the data as is appropriate for each case. If you think it‘s a relevant 
piece of data, if you think brain scans represent a legitimate deficit, then that‘s your 
decision to include them. But I hope I‘ve helped you understand what‘s going on enough 
to navigate those decisions. I can hardly imagine what it‘s like to decide someone‘s fate! 
But I suppose that‘s why we have different professions – I prefer to leave that 
responsibility to you!
u
 
J: Well you are certainly helping me come closer to making these decisions with greater 
confidence. I have been quite concerned with how to interact with this data. Although I 
have to say, I am glad I don’t have your job either. I would probably have a chronic 
headache! 
                                                          
u
 The expert‘s response here to the judge‘s question is an excellent example of maintaining to respective 
boundaries and evades making claims about how the judge should perform his job. Instead of responding 
with an answer of what, specifically to do, the expert redirects the question to suggest a method of problem 
solving and approaching the questions posed by the judge. The judge‘s question may very well be 
interpreted as crossing the informer-decision maker boundary; but the expert instead reinforces his position 
and the refrains from providing a definitive answer regarding what the judge is to do with the information.   
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E: Haha, well I‘m glad we‘re happy where we are, and together we can shed some light 
on where our fields overlap. I might suggest also consulting a bioethicist or someone who 
is interested in philosophy of mind if you‘d like continue the discussion of precisely how 
to apply notions of culpability to this data. Getting multiple points of view might help 
create a holistic picture of this multi-disciplinary problem. But I hope for now I‘ve been 
helpful in describing the science and the techniques behind neuroimaging. The 
implications are definitely a stickier subject!
v
  
J: I think I’ve had just about as much new information on neuroscience and brain scans 
as I can take for one day. I’m curious to ask though, might we meet again for a more in-
depth explanation of how the different areas of the brain function, and how behavioral 
abnormalities might arise when they are compromised? I think that’s the next step in a 
full comprehension of how to really use these scans.  
E: I would love to! Shall we meet next week? I‘m very pleased to hear this meeting was 
helpful to you. 
J: Well it sure beats hiring an expert witness, and the complications or potential biases 
that go along with it. You made understanding how these scans and images work very 
easy to grasp. Even though I know it was a very simplified version. Perhaps I’ll take you 
up on your suggestion and invite someone interested in the ethical and philosophical 
dimensions as well. 
E: I‘d be more than happy to take you up on that, I think it will be a very exciting and 
engaging conversation. 
 
                                                          
v
 Acknowledging and reinforcing his own limitations, and encouraging the judge to seek other opinions is 
another way in which honest brokering differs from the science arbiter or science advocate . 
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Chapter 5 
Analysis and Conclusion  
 Although the dialogue is annotated, there are additional, overarching points to be 
made about how this is an example of honest brokering. It‘s important to note that the 
characters are not meant to suggest honest brokering ought to literally occur between 
these two types of professionals. They are meant to be archetypes, rather than suggesting 
these specific people are the best to engage in this type of discussion. Honest brokering 
between scientific informers and those engaged in criminal sentencing can take many 
forms, and therefore is not intended to be taken literally in this exercise. This is one 
advantage of thought experiments; by being just unrealistic enough they draw out 
particular dimensions of real life processes that go unnoticed. The dialogues are more 
focused on showing the kind of interactions that allow the just use of neuroimaging to 
occur in contemplating their application for sentencing. It illustrates honest brokering as a 
means of achieving a situation where a non-expert becomes informed enough to make 
decisions in determining the applicability and validity of certain images as ‗evidence‘. As 
this evidence is meant to support claims pertaining to the responsibility and moral 
capacities of criminals on trial, through honest brokering a person involved in the 
sentencing process may successfully be able to make decisions about the limits of the 
science, identify claims that are beyond the understanding of science, and embody the 
critical and informed perspective necessary for appropriate use of neuroimaging.  
 As the scans themselves may or may not offer true insight into the cognitive 
abilities of a criminal on trial, it is most important to focus on creating the type of 
environment where those determining how justice is to be applied in criminal 
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proceedings are informed in doing so. The proper use of neuroimaging is dependent on 
particular kinds of issues regarding the translation of complex science from expert to 
non-expert occurs, and how decisions about what they can reveal about criminality is 
allocated to those whose role is to do so. The kind of interactions exhibited by honest 
brokering embody the ideal method of allocating responsibility of experts to act as 
informers, and decision makers to deal with the questions regarding a particular 
criminal‘s neuroimages as ‗proof‘ of their decision making capabilities. It is by 
respecting the limits of each party‘s role and examining cases on an individual basis that 
neuroimaging may be successfully used as a means to determine the moral and legal 
repercussions appropriate for a specific case. 
Honest brokering acts as a safeguard toward appropriate use of neuroimaging by 
shifting focus and power into how a judge or jury deems them applicable on a case by 
case basis. It minimizes the risk of misuse by allowing for informed decisions, making 
lies and illegitimate cases easier to identify. It allows justice to be applied most 
appropriately for those who should be held fully responsible for their crimes, or for those 
who are legitimately challenged to make moral decisions due to neurological dysfunction. 
Maintaining the honest broker approach as experts to help jurors or judges navigate 
through limits of neuroscience provides an ideal solution to use these images in an 
appropriate an accurate manner. As technology further develops, understanding how to 
properly engage in this type of behavior will establish beneficial practices and minimize 
the risk of misuse. Neuroimaging data is important to use when it gives insight into 
criminal behavior, motivation, and propensity toward recidivism. But it must be used in a 
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way the respects its limits and its potential. What becomes of this data, and what it 
signifies, needs to be firmly left in the hands of respective judges and politicians.  
Again, the purpose of this project was not to proclaim specific ways in which 
honest brokering should occur. Rather it proposes a solution to current debate over the 
appropriate use of neuroimaging in determining criminal sentences. It does not propose 
what kinds of changes, if any, should occur in the legal system. It is a means of 
understanding how to address the complexity of human behavior and its relationship to a 
technology that may aid in understanding relevant characteristics like a physiological 
inclination toward violent behavior, rational capabilities, mental illness, and pertinent 
dimensions of criminality. By engaging in a thought experiment, this project illustrates an 
example of how honest brokering provides an opportunity for the proper use of 
neuroimaging. 
Perhaps the incentive to apply honest brokering to criminal trials will raise new questions 
of how to put it into practice. One might imagine what kinds of practices or changes to 
implement that would foster more honest brokering. A concerted effort to raise the 
standard of care in how neuroimaging is discussed would bring more attention to the need 
to improve and clarify its current use. This could initiate changes necessary to have more 
honest conversation about neuroimaging, inside and outside the courtroom. Greater 
awareness to the importance of the information‘s source and delivery is key to using 
neuroimaging properly. As with many aspects of technology and society, practice is the 
best method to reach perfection. Understanding the ingredients necessary in producing a 
successful and appropriate use of neuroimaging in the criminal justice system provides an 
excellent space from which we can explore the relationship of the brain and criminal 
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behavior, and how we hold individuals accountable for their actions. Merging the hearts 
of criminal neuroscience and the justice system inevitably engages questions of 
personhood, responsibility, and moral application of new technology. The way in which 
to answer these questions as they pertain to criminal sentencing is to respect the expertise 
of scientists acting as informers, not decision makers, to allow jurors and judges to decide 
the responsibility a criminal holds in respect to a potential neurological deficit, and to 
engages in honest conversation about the limits of neuroscience in understanding the 
nature of criminal behavior. 
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